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The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic 
or Unrealistic? 
By Stephanie P. Massman 
The systemic financial crisis of 2008 spurred the failure of numerous 
financial and non-financial entities. Regulators addressed each of these 
failures on an ad hoc ex-post basis, granting multiple bailouts in various 
forms. The refusal to extend these bailouts to one firm, Lehman Brothers, 
however,  caused  further  panic  and  contagion  throughout  the  already 
unstable market as one of the largest financial institutions of the U.S. 
underwent  an  extremely  lengthy  and  value-destructive  Chapter  11 
bankruptcy.  Criticism  surrounding  not  only  the  bailouts,  but  also  the 
decision to allow Lehman to fail under the Bankruptcy Code, led to the 
inclusion  of  the  Orderly  Liquidation  Authority  (OLA),  a  regulatory 
alternative to bankruptcy for systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs), in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act.  The  OLA,  although  perceived  to  be  a  radical  departure  from 
traditional bankruptcy, encompasses many familiar resolution principles. 
Most significant departures from the Bankruptcy Code can be explained 
by the necessity to ensure the maintenance of financial stability in the 
national  and  even  global  economy  in  the  case  of  a  SIFI  failure.  By 
banning future government bailouts as a means to handle a SIFI failure, 
the OLA also seeks to end the “Too Big To Fail” subsidy and achieve 
market discipline, such that moral hazard may be minimized. Although 
the prescribed tactics for effectuating a resolution under the OLA may in 
fact implicate new moral hazard concerns, many such issues in existence 
under  the  old  resolution  regime  have  indeed  been  eliminated.  What 
remains to be seen is the extent to which the agencies will assume their 
proscribed authority to regulate these SIFIs and the extent to which the 
market will find their regulations credible.  
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The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic 
or Unrealistic? 
By Stephanie P. Massman 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
No one definitive cause has been pinpointed for the 2008 financial crisis; rather, 
multiple  theories  have  abounded.  The  one  that  ultimately  influenced  the  regulatory 
reform enacted in the wake of the crisis is that a historical government use of bailouts 
created a market assumption of a “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) subsidy, which, along with 
general market discipline erosion, cultivated a pervasive moral hazard problem among all 
players  in  the  financial  industry.  As  a  result,  management  teams  of  large  financial 
institutions made poor investment choices and the creditors of those institutions failed to 
accurately  monitor  risk.  Once  various  financial  institutions  began  failing  in  2008, 
government agencies claimed they had no true ability or authority to handle the problems, 
and thus, the solutions they parsed together were created on an ad hoc basis, which only 
fueled the already widespread uncertainty and panic in the market. Bear Stearns was 
saved from failure by an acquisition by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan), facilitated 
by  a  $29  billion  non-recourse  loan  by  the  Federal  Reserve.  The  Federal  National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac) were placed into government-controlled conservatorship and guaranteed 
access  to  capital  investments  of  up  to  $100  billion  each  from  the  U.S.  Treasury. 
American International Group, Inc. (AIG) was provided with a $85 billion line of secured 
credit  from  the  Federal  Reserve,  which  eventually  rose  to  $182.3  billion.  Lehman 
Brothers  Holdings  Inc.  (Lehman)  was  refused  acquisition  assistance  similar  to  that 
received by Bear Stearns and was instead directed by the Federal Reserve to file for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection under Title 11 of the U.S. Code (Bankruptcy Code). 
The  disorderly  bankruptcy  of  Lehman  caused  systemic  problems  throughout  the 
economy  above  and  beyond  those  that  precipitated  its  failure  in  the  first  place. 
Exacerbation of the crisis is said to have been caused by two aspects of Lehman’s failure: 
(1) Lehman’s interconnectedness within the market, which caused the unwinding of its 
business  positions  to  bring  down  others  with  it,  creating  substantial  direct  collateral 
damage; and (2) regulators’ refusal to uphold the TBTF subsidy and issue a bailout to 
save Lehman from failure, which caused panic and contagion in the market, creating The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic or Unrealistic? 
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substantial  indirect  collateral  damage.  Although  the  extent  to  which  Lehman’s 
bankruptcy actually resulted in any direct collateral damage has been questioned, the 
contagion effects spurred by the market uncertainty it created are undeniable.  
Criticism  reverberated  throughout  both  Wall  Street  and  Main  Street,  from  both 
Democrats and Republicans, after each choice made by regulators throughout the 2008 
financial crisis. Bailouts were criticized for taking money from taxpayers, for fueling 
moral hazard, and for involving government in business activity where it does not belong. 
The Lehman bankruptcy was critiqued for disrupting both domestic and international 
markets and for destroying large amounts of value unnecessarily. Overall lack of pre-
crisis industry oversight was disparaged for failure to prevent these issues in the first 
place.  This  condemnation  culminated  in  the  Dodd-Frank  Wall  Street  Reform  and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), which, inter alia, bans future bailouts and 
essentially seeks to minimize any ad hoc ex-post involvement of government funds to 
prevent the failure of another financial company in a future crisis. In place of these, Title 
I of the Dodd-Frank Act imposes capital and liquidity requirements to minimize risk ex-
ante and reduce the likelihood of initial failure. It also requires submission of Resolution 
Plans—or  “living  wills”—by  certain  designated  “Systemically  Important  Financial 
Institutions”  (SIFIs)  to  demonstrate  their  non-disruptive  resolvability  under  the 
Bankruptcy Code. Title II creates a regulatory alternative to bankruptcy—the Orderly 
Liquidation Authority (OLA)—to wind down failed SIFIs in a way that does not create 
the systemic risk like that which erupted from Lehman’s bankruptcy. Not only does the 
OLA seek to offer an acceptable alternative to regulators to handle a SIFI that has indeed 
failed and cannot—despite its Resolution Plan—be resolved under the Bankruptcy Code, 
but it also seeks to provide incentives to reduce firm risk ex-ante and thereby also further 
limit the likelihood of initial failure.  
The OLA places a failed SIFI—referred to as a “covered financial company” under 
Title II once the OLA has been triggered—into a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) receivership, similar to that used to wind down failed commercial banks under 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA). As such, the FDIC is responsible under Title 
II for promulgating rules to identify precisely how a resolution under the OLA will be 
completed. Thus far, the agency has issued an interim final rule and five final rules to 
provide  a  general  comprehensive  framework  for  this  new  authority.  The  agency  also 
recently closed the comment period on another proposed rule and a notice that outlines The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic or Unrealistic? 
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more specific guidance on the preferred strategy to be used by the FDIC to carry out an 
orderly liquidation of a covered financial company—the Single Point of Entry (SPOE) 
strategy.  Additionally,  the  FDIC  has  established  a  Systemic  Resolution  Advisory 
Committee (SRAC)—comprised of financial market participants; investors; bankruptcy 
professionals;  representatives  from  the  audit,  accounting,  credit  rating,  and  legal 
professions; and academic experts—to assist and advise the FDIC on a broad range of 
issues regarding the resolution of covered financial companies. The SRAC has met four 
times  since  its  inception  in  June  2011.  Comments  published  pursuant  to  the  FDIC’s 
rulemaking, minutes available from the SRAC meetings, speeches and testimonials given 
by members of both the FDIC and the Federal Reserve, and op-eds by various industry 
pundits offer significant insight into the government, industry, and public perceptions of 
this new regulatory resolution regime. This paper seeks to consolidate these views to 
provide a look into the current state of its development.  
Specifically, the first half of this paper will look at the substantive provisions of the 
OLA’s  resolution  mechanisms,  identifying  those  ways  in  which  this  new  resolution 
regime  is  perceived  to  be  similar  to  or  differ  from  traditional  bankruptcy  under  the 
Bankruptcy  Code.  Although  many  consider  the  OLA  to  be  a  rejection  of  traditional 
bankruptcy law for these SIFIs,
1 as a practical matter, it seems to be that these resolutions 
will, in fact, look quite similar to those under the Bankruptcy Code in practice.
2 Although 
there are some significant, irreconcilable departures from the Bankruptcy Code, the more 
significant differences between the two resolution regimes can likely be explained as 
regulatory  protections  the  OLA  provides  to  guarantee  access  to  certain  traditional 
bankruptcy  tools  that  may  not  be  available  in  unique  circumstances  surrounding  the 
collapse of a SIFI.
3 That is, these divergences aim to ensure financial stability of the 
economy as a whole in the case of a SIFI failure. 
                                                         
1 See e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Dodd-Frank For Bankruptcy Lawyers, 19 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287, 287 (2011) (“By common account, the new law reflects a 
repudiation of traditional bankruptcy law when it comes to the collapse of giant corporations that 
threaten the economy as a whole.”) (citing DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: 
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 10 (2011)). 
2 Id. (“Far from reflecting a rejection of bankruptcy principles, quite the opposite is true . . . 
Moreover, the mechanics of the new receivership process incorporate basic bankruptcy 
princples.”). 
3 Id. at 290 (“[The OLA] may not be that different from where we would have been if a new 
chapter of the Code had been crafted to deal with the problem of systemically important financial 
companies.”). The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic or Unrealistic? 
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In the second half of the paper, the focus will shift back to more broadly assess the 
OLA’s  potential  ability  for  successful  achievement  of  both  its  stated  goals—(1)  the 
perseveration of financial stability of the market in the case of a SIFI’s failure, and (2) the 
minimization of moral hazard.
4 Although it is clear that the OLA has the potential to 
achieve both of these to a greater extent than could the Bankruptcy Code in the case of a 
SIFI  failure,  the  degree  to  which  it  can  fully  achieve  both  of  these  twin  goals 
simultaneously  without  sacrificing  the  other  may  be  problematic.  The  answer  to  this 
question of degree seems to turn on both the precise demands each of those goals entails 
as  well  as  the  precise  approach  the  regulators  decide  to  take  in  the  regime’s 
implementation and the certainty the regulators are able provide to the market regarding 
this resolution regime’s future use.  
Outside of the scope of this paper, but of importance when considering this topic is 
the  extent  to  which  the  systemic  financial  crisis of 2008 arose,  not out of the chaos 
caused by Lehman’s bankruptcy, but rather, out of a common reassessment of mortgage-
backed securities causing panic and contagion in the markets, which could not be stopped 
by any form of orderly resolution of any specific firm.
5 To the degree that this was the 
ultimate instigator of the crisis, although the OLA may aid in stemming inflammation of 
similar  future  contagion,  it  is  likely  not  a  suitable  solution  to  preventing  it  or 
extinguishing  it  altogether,  and  it  may  indeed  become  overwhelmed  and  itself  fail 
altogether in the case of too many simultaneous SIFI collapses.
6 
                                                         
4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 204(a) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank 
Act] (“It is the purpose of this title to provide the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial 
companies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States in a manner 
that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral hazard.”). 
5 Kenneth E. Scott, A Guide to The Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: Dodd-Frank Title 
II and Proposed Chapter 14, in BANKRUPTCY NOT BAILOUT: A SPECIAL CHAPTER 14, at VI.A 
(Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor eds., 2012), available at 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/guide-to-resolution-project-20120302.pdf. 
6 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee Meeting Minutes (Dec. 
10, 2012) at 64, available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/2012/2012-12-10_minutes.pdf 
[hereinafter Dec. 2012 SRAC Meeting] (Member Volcker pointing out that although “significant 
progress has been made if the failure of an individual SIFI is envisioned, … the more likely 
scenario is a systemic problem in which this resolution procedure would have to be applied to 
multiple failing SIFIs” and the ability of it to handle that capacity is questionable); See also Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee Meeting Minutes (June 21, 2011) at 
15, available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/11JuneMeetingMins.pdf [hereinafter June 2011 
SRAC Meeting] (FDIC Chairwoman Bair stressing that “the FDIC’s resolution authority by itself 
cannot address the lack of lending standards, lack of transparency, and mischaracterizations in 
asset securitizations and collateralized debt obligations, which never should have gone to market 
in the first place; that there has to be supervisory reforms, including enforcement of higher capital The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic or Unrealistic? 
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II.  COMPARISON OF TITLE II & THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
A.  New Advance Resolution Planning Tools  
Two provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act provide for new advance resolution planning 
that will improve the resolvability of a SIFI under any resolution regime: (1) the Title I 
Resolution Plan requirement
7 and (2) the cross-border resolution coordination directive.
8 
It  has  been  generally  acknowledged  that  planning  is  essential  in  order  to  achieve  an 
efficient  and  effective  orderly  resolution  of  a  SIFI,
9 and  a  great  deal  of  work  by  an 
extraordinary number of parties has already gone into both of these advance resolution 
planning efforts.  
1.  Title I Resolution Plans 
Title I, Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that certain designated SIFIs 
prepare Resolution Plans—or “living wills”—to demonstrate how the company would be 
resolved in a rapid and orderly manner under the Bankruptcy Code in the event of the 
company’s  material  financial  distress  or  failure.
10  These  plans  will  improve  the 
resolvability of a company under either resolution regime (1) by providing increased 
transparency of the firm’s organizational structure to those effectuating a resolution and 
(2)  by  actually  granting  to  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the  FDIC  the  authority  to 
preemptively force a firm’s restructuring to improve its resolvability.  
Although  these  plans  must  specifically  illustrate  resolution  under  only  the 
Bankruptcy Code, and not Title II, they have the potential to improve the resolvability of 
a SIFI under Title II as well by providing the FDIC with a better understanding of each 
SIFI’s  structure,  complexity,  and  processes.  These  plans  must  include,  inter  alia,  a 
detailed, “jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analyses of the actions each would need to take in a 
resolution, as well as the actions to be taken by host authorities,”
11 a “description of the 
                                                                                                                                                          
standards that will provide a more stable base to prevent institutions from having all of this 
toxicity on their balance sheets going forward; and that there needs to be market discipline to 
complement the supervisory process for these institutions.”). 
7 Id. § 165(d) 
8 Id. § 210(a)(1)(N) 
9 June 2011 SRAC Meeting, supra note 6, at 9. 
10 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(1). 
11 James R. Wigand, Director, & Richard J. Osterman, Jr., Acting Gen. Council, Office of 
Complex Financial Institutions, Statement to U.S. H.R. Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations & Comm. on Fin. Services: Who Is Too Big Too Fail? Examining the Application 
of Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act (Apr. 16, 2013), available at The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic or Unrealistic? 
8 
covered company’s corporate governance structure for creating the resolution plan, . . . 
information  regarding  the  overall  organization  structure  of  the  company,  . . .  an 
identification  of  funding  and  liquidity  requirements,  . . .  information  concerning  the 
company’s  management  information  systems,  . . .  [and]  a  description  of  the 
interconnectedness and interdependencies of the company’s various affiliates.”
12 Initial 
plans  had  only  to  assume  “baseline”  economic  conditions,  however  subsequent 
submissions may require the companies to take into account “adverse” and “severely 
adverse” economic conditions.
13 For example, the assumptions provided to first round 
filers were that “an idiosyncratic failure occurs; the firm’s failure does not significantly 
disrupt the market because other participants assume parts of the business; the firm has 
no access to unsecured funding; there is no extraordinary government support; and that 
all material entities fail.”
14 
The FDIC’s stated goal of these Resolution Plans is to identify “each firm’s critical 
operations and core business lines, map[] out those operations and core business lines to 
each firm’s material legal entities, and identify[] the key obstacles to a rapid and orderly 
resolution  in  bankruptcy.”
15 Obstacles identified from the first round of filers include 
“management information systems’ limitations on the ability to aggregate data at the 
legal  entity  level;  uncertainty  with  respect  to  international  regimes  and  actions;  and 
liquidity needs and funding mechanisms.”
16 Other potential obstacles may be “such areas 
as a firm’s internal organizational structure, interconnections of the firm to other systemic 
financial companies” and “default and termination provisions of certain types of financial 
contracts.”
17 Interestingly,  the  FDIC  does  not  seem  to  have  given  explicit  guidance 
regarding  treatment  of  the  FDIC  insured  depository  institutions  (IDIs)  under  the 
Resolution Plans. That is, it is unclear whether the SIFIs should assume that the IDI 
subsidiaries of the SIFIs would be put into a traditional FDIA receivership in tandem with 
the holding company’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy or if the SIFI will be allowed or expected 
to ensure the IDI subsidiary’s continued operations. Moreover, it is significant to note 
                                                                                                                                                          
http://fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr1613.html [hereinafter Wigand & Osterman (Apr. 
2013)].  
12 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee Meeting Minutes (Jan. 25, 
2012) at 36, available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/2012/2012-01-25_minutes.pdf 
[hereinafter January 2012 SRAC Meeting]. 
13 Wigand & Osterman (Apr. 2013), supra note 11. 
14 Dec. 2012 SRAC Meeting, supra note 6, at 65. 
15 Wigand & Osterman (Apr. 2013), supra note 11. 
16 Dec. 2012 SRAC Meeting, supra note 6, at 65. 
17 Wigand & Osterman (Apr. 2013), supra note 11. The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic or Unrealistic? 
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that  these  plans  are  entirely  non-binding  in  the  case  of  a  SIFI  failure  either  through 
traditional bankruptcy or the OLA.
18 
Many, including members of the FDIC, argue that the true usefulness of the Title I 
resolution plans provision, however, lies not in the actual Resolution Plans themselves, 
but in the mechanism which this provision provides to allow the Federal Reserve and the 
FDIC to force a simplification of a firm’s business structure to make it truly resolvable.
19 
This  forced  restructuring  may  be  imposed  if  the  company  fails  to  submit  a  credible 
resolution  plan,  and  it  may  entail  (1)  “more  stringent  capital,  leverage,  or  liquidity 
requirements,” (2) “restrictions on the growth, activities, or operations of the company,”
20 
or  (3)  eventually,  divestiture  requirements.
21 However,  such  measures  require  a  joint 
determination by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC that the company’s Resolution Plan 
is either (a) not credible or (b) would not facilitate an orderly resolution of the company 
under  the  Bankruptcy  Code,
22  and  neither  guidelines  nor  definitions  for  these 
determinations are provided in either the statute or implementing regulations.
23 Although 
this lack of clear guidance may be a delimiting aspect to allow the FDIC and the Federal 
Reserve to exercise their sound expert judgment,
24 it also creates uncertainty as to how 
                                                         
18 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(6) (“A resolution plan submitted in accordance with this subsection 
shall not be binding on a bankruptcy court, a receiver appointed under title II, or any other 
authority that is authorized or required to resolve the [SIFI].”). 
19 See e.g., Jeremiah O. Norton, Member, Board of Directors of the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 
Remarks to the American Bankers Association: Discussion on the Current State of Resolution 
Planning (Oct. 21, 2013), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spoct2113.html 
[hereinafter Norton (Oct. 2013)]; Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 
Can We End Financial Bailouts?, Remarks to the Boston Economic Club (May 7, 2014), available 
at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spmay0714.html (“For the market to serve as 
disciplinarian and for bankruptcy to be a viable means for resolving systemically important 
financial firms, these largest most complicated firms must become eligible for bankruptcy. Ending 
bailouts using the tools authorized in Dodd-Frank requires that the Living Will process be 
vigorously implemented.”). 
20 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(5)(A) 
21 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(5)(B) 
22 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(4), (5) 
23 See Norton (Oct. 2013), supra note 19 (pointing out the lack of definition of “credible,” the lack 
of “specificity as to how the Agencies should determine whether a plan is credible or deficient,” 
and the lack of clarity regarding the definition of “orderly resolution”); see also Orderly 
Liquidation Authority, 12 CFR § 381.2(o) (2013) (defining “rapid and orderly resolution” as “a 
liquidation or reorganization that can be accomplished within a reasonable period of time and in a 
manner that substantially mitigates the risk that the failure of the covered financial company 
would have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the U.S.”). Note that neither 
“reasonable period of time” nor “substantially mitigates” are defined. 
24 See Jan. 2012 SRAC Meeting, supra note 12, at 38 (comments by member Fisher). The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic or Unrealistic? 
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this authority will be exercised or if it will be exercised at all.
25 Moreover, despite the 
significant support this approach seems to have from the FDIC, it is clear that this process 
will  be  subject  to  significant  politicization  that  could  stifle  its  efficacy  in  a  manner 
reminiscent of regulators’ experience with the Volcker Rule and Section 5(e) of the Bank 
Holding  Company  Act,  which  grants  regulators  the  authority  to  separate  problem 
affiliates to prevent them from endangering a commercial bank but which has never been 
used.
26 
If,  indeed,  the  FDIC  and  the  Federal  Reserve  decline  to  exercise  this  ex-ante 
restructuring authority, some argue that increased public disclosure of these plans would 
have the effect of enhancing market discipline
27 such that the companies would be under 
pressure to reorganize themselves.
28 Such public disclosure could come in the form of 
improvement  of  the  public  portions  of  the  Resolution  Plans—as  those  thus  far 
disseminated have been highly criticized as uninformative
29—or in the form of public 
                                                         
25 See Norton (Oct. 2013), supra note 19 (commenting that policymakers could water down the 
effectiveness of living wills by taking a “more incremental approach by arguing that because terms 
like ‘credible’ and ‘orderly’ are hard to define” or by “view[ing] that orderly resolution of [SIFIs] 
under traditional bankruptcy law is improbable given recent experiences in 2008 and therefore 
would not put the considerable weight of their authorities, efforts, and resources behind the 
process”).  
26 See Hoenig, supra note 19.  
27 See e.g., The Credit Roundtable Comment Letter to the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Notice regarding 
Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 
78 Fed. Reg. 76614, Feb. 14, 2014, at 2 [hereinafter Credit Roundtable Comment on SPOE 
Notice]. 
28 See Systemic Risk Council Comment Letter to the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Notice regarding 
Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 
78 Fed. Reg. 76614, Feb. 18, 2014, at 5 [hereinafter SRC Comment on SPOE Notice]; Letter from 
Systemic Risk Council to Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve & Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 
2, 2013), available at http://www.systemicriskcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/SRC-
letter-to-Fed-and-FDIC-re-Living-Wills-12-02-13.pdf (calling for increased disclosure and 
credibility of the public portions of § 165(d) Resolution Plans). See also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 
Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee Meeting Transcript (Dec. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Dec. 
2013 SRAC Meeting] (Member Herring pointed out that while public market discipline can and 
should be a goal of the public portions of the living wills, more useful guidance regarding the 
organizations’ structures must be provided). 
29 See SRC Comment on SPOE Notice, supra note 28, at 5; Credit Roundtable Comment on SPOE 
Notice, supra note 27, at 2. See also Dec. 2013 SRAC Meeting, supra note 28 (Member Herring 
noting that there was no standardized reporting, terminology, or interpretation of “material entity” 
among the public portions of the living wills and that data from the SEC and Bankscope does not 
align with that in the living wills. “At the end of the day, you really knew little more about the 
structure of the firm, or you knew nothing more about the structure of the firm than you would 
have known if you had taken all the public documents and tried to reconcile them.”). The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic or Unrealistic? 
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releases of the findings of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve regarding the credibility of 
the living wills.
30 
Thus far, three tiers of eligible companies have filed their plans. These include bank 
holding  companies  with  total  consolidated  assets  of  $50  billion  or  more,
31 nonbank 
financial companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has designated 
for  supervision  by  the  Federal  Reserve,
32 and  IDIs  with  assets  over  $50  billion.
33 
Although some have voiced positivity regarding the credibility and usefulness of these 
plans,
34 many continue to question their meaningfulness and some go so far as to declare 
them entirely lacking in credibility.
35 While some believe that reliance upon the OLA to 
handle a SIFI failure is a satisfactory and appropriate solution,
36 others sharply critique 
this  view  as  sapping  incentives  for  market  discipline  and  perpetuating  systemic  risk. 
These critics call for regulatory action to take full advantage of the authority granted 
under this provision of the Dodd-Frank Act to force the divestiture of certain assets or 
force a reorganization of the company to make it truly resolvable under the Bankruptcy 
Code.
37  
2.  Cross-Border Coordination 
The Dodd-Frank Act includes in the OLA a mandate to the FDIC to “coordinate, to 
the maximum extent possible, with the appropriate foreign financial authorities regarding 
the orderly liquidation of any covered financial company” with cross-border operations.
38 
The  achievement  of  this  directive  to  establish  effective  cross-border  coordination  is 
widely acknowledged to be essential to the resolution of a global SIFI (G-SIFI).
39 Indeed, 
                                                         
30 See SRC Comment on SPOE Notice, supra note 28, at 5. 
31 Resolution Plans, 12 C.F.R. § 381.2(f)(ii), (iii) (2013). 
32 Id. § 381.2(f)(i). 
33 Resolution and Receivership Rules, 12 C.F.R. § 360.10 (2013). 
34 See Dec. 2013 SRAC Meeting, supra note 28 (Member Cohen commenting, “Having had an 
opportunity to be involved in several of these plans, I can assure, at least the ones I was involved 
with, the Boards were deeply involved. . . [T]hey are intensely focused on liquidity, and they are 
intensely focused on making sure they don’t bring others down with them.”). 
35 See Johnson, Big Banks, supra note 73 (“living wills cannot be credible because the big banks 
are incredibly complex, with cross-border operations and a web of interlocking activities”).  
36 See Hoenig, supra note 19 (citing BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE PATH TO 
A SOLUTION (May 14, 2013). 
37 See id. (“The Fed and the F.D.I.C. must require remedial action, meaning that something about 
the size, structure, and strategy of the megabanks must change . . . . Section 165 is potentially 
valuable, but only if the relevant officials recognize this reality and act on it.”). 
38 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(1)(N). 
39 See e.g., Charles Randell, The FSB’s “Key Attributes”: The Road to Cross-Border Resolution of 
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such coordination—and specifically, assurances of such coordination—is one of the most 
significant concerns addressed in the comment letters to the FDIC’s SPOE Notice. This 
coordination, while being established under the umbrella of the OLA, is meant to provide 
assurances to all relevant jurisdictions in the case of a G-SIFI failure abroad, such that it 
should  be  extraordinarily  useful  even  upon  a  G-SIFI’s  failure  through  traditional 
bankruptcy. Prior to Lehman’s failure, there was no such coordination; in fact, it was not 
even “the subject of signification international attention” at all.
40 It is because of this lack 
of coordination that led foreign regulators to panic when Lehman did fail, causing over 
100  separate  insolvency  proceedings  across  jurisdictions,
41 ring-fencing,  and  liquidity 
crises among the company’s internationally sprawled subsidiaries. According to FDIC 
Chairman Martin Gruenberg, there has been “a sea [of] change since 2008 in terms of 
international recognition of the importance of these cross-border relationships and the 
need for cooperation.”
42 This topic has now become “a subject of intense international 
attention”  on  both  the  multilateral  level  by  the  Basel  Committee  and  the  Financial 
Stability  Board  (FSB),  as  well  as  the  bilateral  level  between  individual  national  and 
regional regulators.
43  
Most  significantly  on  the  multilateral  level  is  the  FSB’s  publication  of  its  Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution for Financial Institutions. These Key Attributes, which 
extensively parallel the Bankruptcy Code and OLA,
44 seek to establish an international 
standard for resolution regimes and to create a framework for international cooperation in 
the resolution of a G-SIFI. While not formally binding, the Key Attributes establish a 
program of country and thematic peer reviews of member jurisdictions to incentivize 
compliance. Notably, the EU has recently come substantially further into compliance 
with the Key Attributes, and therefore into further alignment with the U.S. resolution 
regimes, through the announcement of their Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, a 
financial  regulatory  framework  for  winding  down  failed  banks  that  applies  to  all  28 
                                                                                                                                                          
the resolution of G-SIFIs therefore needs to produce a suite of resolution tools, but also an answer 
to the problem of cross-border cooperation.”). 
40 See Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks to the Annual Wash. 
Conf. of the Inst. of Int’l Bankers (Mar. 4, 2013), available at 
http://fdic.gov/news/news/speechs/spmar0413.html [hereinafter Gruenberg (Mar. 2013)].  
41 See Harvey R. Miller & Maurice Horwitz, A Better Solution Is Needed for Failed Financial 
Giants, N.Y. Times (Oct. 9, 2012) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/a-better-solution-is-
needed-for-failed-financial-giants/. 
42 Dec. 2012 SRAC Meeting, supra note 6, at 43. 
43 See Gruenberg (Mar. 2013), supra note 40. 
44 E.g., use of resolution plans, “no worse off than in liquidation” requirements, bail-in 
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Member States.
45 It remains to be seen, however, how this directive will be implemented 
into statutes in the individual Member States, an issue that could crucially determine its 
effectiveness. Moreover, this directive applies only to banks and not to nonbank financial 
institutions, the category under which Lehman would have fallen prior to its failure. The 
establishment of a framework for the resolution of such nonbank financial institutions has 
yet to proceed past a consultation, which was occurred in 2012.
46 
In addition to contributing to the development of multilateral coordination initiatives 
to bring more countries closer towards the same resolution standards, the FDIC has also 
sought  to  establish  more  specific  bilateral  agreements  with  certain  key  jurisdictions. 
These  efforts  seek  to  “identify  impediments  to  orderly  resolution  that  are  unique  to 
specific jurisdictions and discuss how to mitigate such impediments through rule changes 
or  bilateral  cooperation,”  “examine  possible  resolution  strategies  and  practical  issues 
related to implementation of such strategies with respect to particular jurisdictions,” and 
establish information sharing coordination.
47 In December of 2012, the FDIC published a 
joint paper with the Bank of England outlining how the SPOE strategy would be an 
effective way to resolve a cross-border financial institution without disrupting operations 
in subsidiaries in either jurisdiction.
48 As is evident by this paper and by the U.K.’s recent 
acceptance of the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, the U.K. is increasingly 
adopting U.S. methods of resolution such that a case such as Lehman’s could be handled 
more efficiently in the future. Additionally, significant bilateral work has been done with 
Switzerland,
49 Japan,
50 and the European Commission (EC);
51 and the FDIC has engaged 
                                                         
45 Press Release, European Commission, Comm’r Barnier welcomes trilogue agreement on the 
framework for bank recovery and resolution (Dec. 12, 2013) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-1140_en.htm.   
46 European Commission, Consultation on a Possible Recovery and Resolution Framework for 
Financial Institutions Other Thank Banks (2012) 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/nonbanks/consultation-document_en.pdf.  
47 Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Statement to U.S. S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: Implementing Wall Street Reform: Enhancing Bank 
Supervision and Reducing Systemic Risk (June 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjun0612.html. 
48 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & BANK OF ENG., JOINT PAPER, RESOLVING GLOBALLY ACTIVE, 
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Dec. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/2012/gsifi.pdf.  
49 James R. Wigand, Director, Office of Complex Financial Institutions, Statement to the U.S. S. 
Subcomm. on National Security and International Trade and Finance: Improving Cross Border 
Resolution to Better Protect Taxpayers and The Economy (May 15, 2013), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spmay1513_2.html [hereinafter Wigand (May 2013)] 
(indicating that both bilateral and trilateral—including the U.K.—work has been done with 
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in active dialogues to conclude Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with at least 26 
jurisdictions.
52   
Although many continue to question the efficacy of these efforts and doubt the ability 
of regulators to effectuate any meaningful solution to the cross-border problem,
53 a heat-
mapping exercise undertaken by the FDIC suggests that “international cooperation is far 
more closely within reach than . . . has been recognized.” The findings of that exercise 
demonstrated  “that,  while  a  systemically  important  financial  institution  may  have 
thousands of subsidiaries and a large global footprint, an international resolution strategy 
would actually be dealing with a fairly manageable list of key foreign jurisdictions to 
prioritize  and  small  number  of  legal  entities  that  are  very  powerful  drivers  in  the 
operations of the institution’s global footprint.”
54 For example, over 90% of the total 
reported foreign activity for the top seven U.S. SIFIs is located in just three foreign 
jurisdictions.
55 Moreover, over 85% of the total reported foreign activity for those top 
seven U.S. SIFIs comes from just one to seven legal entities.
56 Despite these findings, it 
remains  undeniable  that  Lehman  was  comprised  of  about  8,000  legal  entities  in  40 
countries, and its failure spurred over 100 separate insolvency proceedings around the 
world.
57  
In addition to mere coordination and information sharing agreements with foreign 
regulators, the FDIC is also contemplating ex-ante subsidiarization requirements, which 
would require SIFIs to conduct their foreign operations through subsidiaries rather than 
                                                                                                                                                          
50 Id. (indicating that the FDIC had meetings in March 2013 with the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation of Japan “to discuss the FDIC’s resolution strategy under the OLA and the treatment 
of qualified financial contracts under the Dodd-Frank Act” and the Japan Financial Services 
Agency “to discuss our respective resolution regimes,” including the “current legislative proposal 
to amend Japan’s existing resolution regime to enhance authorities ability to resolve SIFIs.”). 
51 Gruenberg (Mar. 2013), supra note 40 (indicating that the FDIC meets twice a year with a 
working group from the EC to discuss issues of resolution and deposit insurance, including “the 
EC’s proposed directive on bank recovery and resolution; deposit guarantee regimes; the FDIC’s 
work on planning for SIFI resolutions; and future initiatives that might be undertaken related to 
cross-border cooperation.”). 
52 Dec. 2012 SRAC Meeting, supra note 6, at 56. 
53 See Miller & Horwitz, supra note 41 (arguing that the OLA does not adequately address cross-
border issues). 
54 Jan. 2012 SRAC Meeting, supra note 12, at 40. 
55 Dec. 2012 SRAC Meeting, supra note 6, at 55. 
56 Id. at 55. 
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through branches.
58 This proposal has been met with significant contention from both 
sides of the debate. Those in favor of it believe that such a subsidiarization approach 
would produce increased operational efficiencies, increased transparency for investors, 
and increased resolvability under either the Bankruptcy Code or the OLA.
59 On the other 
hand, many believe forcing such subsidiarization upon a company would be a costly and 
inefficient regulation, providing little or no benefit.
60 Moreover, some believe that, absent 
adequate prepositioned intracompany lines of credit, a subsidiarization structure could 
pose  a  threat  to  liquidity  transfers  upon  commencement  of  a  resolution  proceeding, 
whereas access by the subsidiary to the holding company’s liquidity is more assured in a 
branch structure.
61  
While the efforts that have been made by the FDIC in the cross-border coordination 
arena have established a significant “foundation that provides a basis for regulators to 
share information and be engaged with each other,”
62 as of yet none of the international 
efforts  have  included  any  binding  agreements.  It  is  clear  that  industry  and  public 
participants will not be assuaged by the FDIC’s coordination efforts until they result in 
something more binding than mere MOUs. Of significant uncertainty is not only whether 
foreign  regulators  would  be  willing  to  recognize  a  resolution  under  the  OLA  or 
Bankruptcy Code in the U.S., but whether the FDIC would be willing to recognize a 
resolution under a foreign regulator’s oversight. While the EU’s recent Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive does recognize such a commitment to such recognition, the 
FDIC does not seem to have made clear a parallel one.
63 Moreover, Vice Chairman of the 
FDIC Thomas Hoenig has recognized that as matters currently stand, the failure of a G-
SIFI likely would spark international ring fencing and multiple resolution proceedings, 
just as Lehman’s did.
64 So although the current status quo may be an improvement from 
                                                         
58 Notice regarding Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point 
of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614, 76,623–24 (Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter SPOE Notice]. 
59 See SRC Comment on SPOE Notice, supra note 28, at 4. 
60 See The Institute of International Bankers Comment Letter to the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Notice 
regarding Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry 
Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614, Feb. 18, 2014, at 4 [hereinafter IIB Comment on SPOE Notice]. 
61 See Credit Roundtable Comment on SPOE Notice, supra note 27, at 4. 
62 Jan. 2012 SRAC Meeting, supra note 12, at 42. 
63 See The Institute of International Finance Comment Letter to the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Notice 
regarding Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry 
Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614, Feb. 18, 2014, at 3 [hereinafter IIF Comment on SPOE Notice]. 
64 Hoenig, supra note 19 (“ . . . despite improved and on-going efforts at international cooperation, 
there are no international bankruptcy laws sufficient to sort out cross-border creditor rights and no 
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the state of information sharing in resolution regimes prior to the crisis, it is clear that a 
substantial amount of work remains to be done. 
B.  Triggering the OLA 
A resolution of a SIFI under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, utilizing the OLA and 
appointing the FDIC as receiver of a failed financial company, is triggered following a 
series of rather complicated steps. It first requires a recommendation to the Secretary of 
the Treasury by the FDIC (Securities and Exchange Commission for brokers and dealers 
and Federal Insurance Office for insurance companies) and the Federal Reserve. The 
Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the President must then determine, inter 
alia, that: (1) the financial company is “in default or in danger of default;” (2) its failure 
under the Bankruptcy Code “would have serious adverse effects on financial stability in 
the United States;” (3) “no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent the 
default;”  and  (4)  the  company  satisfies  a  rather  convoluted  definition  of  a  “financial 
company.”
65 These rather imprecise criteria determine the circumstances that may lead to 
the resolution of a SIFI under the OLA rather than under the Bankruptcy Code. 
1.  “In Default or in Danger of Default” 
The determination regarding whether a financial company is “in default or in danger 
of default” is relatively straightforward. It is to be based upon a finding that: (1) a case 
has been or is likely to be filed under the Bankruptcy Code; (2) the financial company has 
incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete all or substantially all of its capital; 
(3) the liabilities of the financial company exceed or are likely to soon exceed its assets; 
or (4) the financial company cannot or soon will not be able to pay its obligations as they 
become due in the normal course of business.
66 Although this determination is somewhat 
more discretionary, it is similar enough to that required for the commencement of an 
involuntary case under the Bankruptcy Code,
67 such that a failing company should not 
truly be surprised to lose control in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding or in a Title II 
                                                                                                                                                          
firms. "Ring fencing" assets will be the norm rather than the exception. Under such circumstances, 
it would be foolish to ignore the fact that countries will protect their domestic creditors and stop 
outflows of funds when crisis threatens.”). 
65 Dodd-Frank Act § 203(b) (listing factors necessary for receivership). 
66 Id. § 203(c)(4) (defining circumstances to be considered “in default or in danger of default”). 
67 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (2006) (ordering relief in involuntary case against debtor only if (1) “the 
debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s debts as such debts become due” or (2) a custodian 
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receivership.
68 Despite this, several voices from the industry have called for more clarity 
surrounding  the  determination  of  “in  danger  of  default,”
69 pointing  out  that  it  is  not 
necessarily obvious that a company may be nearing the breaking point, as was the case 
with  Lehman.
70 Whether  regulators  would  have  the  ability  and  the  access  to  inside 
information necessary to make such a determination when industry professionals cannot 
is also questionable. 
2.  “Serious Adverse Effects on Financial Stability” and “No Viable Private 
Sector Alternative” 
The determinations that a resolution under the Bankruptcy Code would have “serious 
adverse effects on the financial stability of the United States” and that “no viable private 
sector alternative is available to prevent the default” are somewhat more ambiguous. The 
FDIC has repeatedly emphasized the position that traditional bankruptcy is the preferred 
method  of  resolution  for  any  company.
71 However,  despite  some  argument  that  the 
Bankruptcy Code can, indeed, effectively handle large corporate resolutions,
72 the more 
universally  acknowledged  point  of  view  is  that  the  Code  simply  cannot  be  used 
successfully to resolve a SIFI in any case, either because there is something inherently 
different  about  financial  companies  that  requires  an  alternative  resolution  process 
different from bankruptcy
73 or because these specific firms are simply too large to be 
resolved in bankruptcy without causing collateral failures due to interconnectedness or 
                                                         
68 Baird & Morrison, supra note 1, at 292. 
69 See e.g., Credit Roundtable Comment on SPOE Notice, supra note 27, at 3; Occupy the SEC 
Comment Letter to the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Notice regarding Resolution of Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76614, Mar. 18, 
2014, at 2 [hereinafter Occupy the SEC Comment on SPOE Notice]. 
70 See Occupy the SEC Comment on SPOE Notice, supra note 69, at 2. 
71 See e.g., Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks to American 
Banker Regulatory Symposium (Sept. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spsep1412.html [hereinafter Gruenberg (Sept. 
2012)] (“[U]nder Dodd-Frank, bankruptcy is the option of first recourse… Only in extraordinary 
circumstances in which an orderly resolution could not be conducted under the bankruptcy code 
would a Title II orderly liquidation be considered. Title II should not be viewed as a replacement 
for bankruptcy, but as a last resort to allow the firm to fail without broad systemic disruption.”). 
72 See e.g., id. at 292 (“The success of chapter 11 in handling the collapse of very large 
corporations (such as Enron, General Motors, and Conesco) suggests that [the threshold for 
determining that the use of the Bankruptcy Code ‘would have serious adverse effects on the 
financial stability of the United States’] is a high one.”) . 
73 Dec. 2013 SRAC Meeting, supra note 28 (Member Cohen commenting, “There seems to be a 
widespread assumption that Title II is an anomaly, that it is radically different than anything that 
has been before. And rather than that, I think the opposite conclusion is correct; that Title II is just 
a recognition of what we have recognized for scores of years which is that you resolve financial 
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contagion.
74 On the other hand, it is not even entirely clear whether Lehman’s bankruptcy 
caused what would be categorized as “serious adverse effects on the financial stability of 
the United States.”
75 Further complicating the matter is that some people are now calling 
for changes to the Bankruptcy Code, which could significantly change the conditions that 
call for use of the OLA instead of traditional bankruptcy.
76 Although this is not yet an 
issue, if changes to the Bankruptcy Code are enacted, the analysis under this prong of the 
OLA trigger may be significantly altered.  
What  would  constitute  an  acceptable  “viable  private  sector  alternative”  is  also 
unclear.  While  it  could  be  something  of  the  sort  that  aided  Long  Term  Capital 
Management  (LTCM),  Bear  Stearns,  or  Merrill  Lynch,  each  of  these  “private  sector 
alternatives  to  default”  raises  questionable  results.  First  of  all,  the  LTCM  and  Bear 
Stearns deals were significantly influenced by (or, in the case of Bear Stearns, partially 
funded  by)  government  regulators,  and  thus  not  entirely  “privately”  accomplished. 
Additionally, it is questionable whether the LTCM workout would even be possible given 
the existence of the OLA. That is, the availability of the OLA may make private parties 
less inclined to even come to the negotiating table to aid a failing financing company if 
they believe that the FDIC will simply be appointed to handle the company’s resolution.
77 
Moreover, the Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch acquisitions by JPMorgan and Bank of 
America,  respectively,  raise  questions  regarding  the  ever-expanding  size  of  these 
financial companies and their true resolvability under the Bankruptcy Code as required 
                                                         
74 See e.g., Simon Johnson, Big Banks and the Failure of Bankruptcy, N.Y. Times (Dec. 19, 2013) 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/19/big-banks-and-the-failure-of-bankruptcy/ 
[hereinafter Johnson, Big Banks] (“[A]s matters currently stand, bankruptcy for a big financial 
company would imply chaotic disaster for world markets (as happened after Lehman Brothers 
failed) . . . Bankruptcy cannot work for big banks at their current scale and level of complexity. It 
is not a viable option under current law.”). 
75 Compare Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC Quarterly 31, 31 (2011), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2011 vol5_2/FDIC_QuarterlyVol5No2_entire 
v4.pdf [hereinafter FDIC Lehman Report] (“The disorderly and costly nature of the [Lehman] 
bankruptcy—the largest…bankruptcy in U.S. history—contributed to the massive financial 
disruption of late 2008”) with HAL S. SCOTT, INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION 3 (2012), 
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2012.11.20_Interconnectedness_and_Contagion.pdf  
(“Despite the complexity of the bankruptcy process, evidence suggests that direct exposure of 
counterparties to Lehman entities that filed in the United States was not destabilizing in the 
immediate aftermath of Lehman’s failure.”).  
76 See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy Code Chapter 14: A Proposal, in BANKRUPTCY NOT 
BAILOUT: A SPECIAL CHAPTER (Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor eds., 2012), available at 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Bankruptcy-Code-Chapter-14-Proposal-
20120228.pdf.  
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under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act. Ultimately, despite the FDIC’s insistence that the 
OLA will be used only in “extraordinary circumstances,”
78 it appears to be the consensus 
that  any  SIFI  failure  would  be  indeed  be  extraordinary  such  that  neither  traditional 
bankruptcy nor a private market resolution could effectively handle the situation.   
3.  “Financial Company” 
Lastly, the determination of whether a SIFI satisfies the definition of a “financial 
company” set forth in Title II has the potential to create significant uncertainty. This 
determination is made wholly apart from that made under Title I to subject companies to 
the  enhanced  supervision  and  prudential  standards  of  Section  165,  including  the 
requirement of the creation of a Resolution Plan. Those subject to Title I, Section 165 are 
(1) “nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors” and (2) “bank 
holding  companies  with  total  consolidated  assets  equal  to  or  greater  than 
$50,000,000,000.”
79 On the other hand, the companies qualifying for resolution under 
Title  II  due  to  their  status  as  “financial  compan[ies]”  are:  (1)  “bank  holding 
company[ies];”  (2)  “nonbank  financial  compan[ies]  supervised  by  the  Board  of 
Governors;” (3) “company[ies] that [are] predominantly engaged in activities that… are 
financial in nature or incidental thereto;” and (4) subsidiaries of those companies that are 
predominantly engaged in financial activities.
80 Thus, there are a significant number of 
institutions that may be eligible for resolution under Title II, but may not be subject to ex-
ante enhanced supervision and prudential standards under Title I and may not be required 
to submit a Resolution Plan. These institutions fall into two different categories: (1) those 
that are eligible for Title I supervision but whom the FSOC has deemed do not “pose a 
threat to the financial stability of the United States”
81; and (2) those that are not eligible 
for Title I supervision at all—including (i) bank holding companies with assets under $50 
billion; and (ii) companies and subsidiaries who are “financial companies” as defined 
under Title II but not Title I.
82  
                                                         
78 See Gruenberg (Sept. 2012), supra note 71. 
79 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(a)(1). 
80 Id. § 201(a)(11). 
81 Id. § 115(a)(1). 
82 Compare Id. § 201(a)(11)(B)(iii) (Title II’s definition of “financial companies” includes those 
who are “predominantly engaged in activities that… are financial in nature or incidental thereto”) 
with id. § 201(a)(4)(B)(ii) (Title I’s definition of “U.S. nonbank financial companies” includes 
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Although administrative flexibility is likely useful in making the decision regarding 
whether  or  not  to  put  a  company  into  an  OLA  receivership,  putting  a  SIFI  and  its 
creditors on notice that it may be eligible for resolution under the OLA by also subjecting 
it to Title I supervision would likely be very beneficial. Moreover, the FDIC and the 
Federal  Reserve  could  largely  remedy  the  uncertainty  caused  by  the  definitional 
inconsistencies  through  clearer  rulemaking,  although  they  have  currently  maintained 
those  inconsistencies  in  their  existing  rules  regarding  these  definitions.
83 Thus,  there 
remains some significant work to be done to bring Title I and Title II into alignment and 
to adequately put SIFIs on notice of their OLA resolution eligibility. Whether or not the 
FDIC and the Federal Reserve can attain such coordination may be indicative of the 
potential for future agency coordination, which will be essential to a successful resolution 
of a SIFI under the OLA. 
C.  Key Divergences of the OLA from Traditional Bankruptcy Law 
Although the OLA may at first appear to be a radical departure from traditional 
bankruptcy law, as a practical matter, resolutions under this new regime will likely look 
quite similar to those under the Bankruptcy Code. For example, both regimes include the 
fundamentals of bankruptcy: the automatic stay,
84 creditor priority,
85 the “no worse off 
than in liquidation” requirement,
86 avoidance of preferential and fraudulent transfers,
87 
contract assumption or rejection power,
88 etc. In fact, Title II includes a specific directive 
to the FDIC to harmonize the OLA, to the extent possible, with traditional bankruptcy 
law.
89 And  although  there  are  certain  key  divergences  of  the  OLA  from  traditional 
bankruptcy law, to a great extent, many of these new tools available under the OLA are 
merely regulatory protections meant to guarantee access to certain “creative” bankruptcy 
tools that are currently in practice under the Bankruptcy Code but which may not be 
                                                         
83 Compare Definition of “Predominantly Engaged in Activities That Are Financial in Nature or 
Incidental Thereto,” 78 Fed. Reg. 34,712 (June 10, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) 
(FDIC rule for Title II) with Definitions of “Predominantly Engaged In Financial Activities” and 
“Significant” Nonbank Financial Company and Bank Holding Company, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,756 
(Apr. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 242) (Federal Reserve’s rule for Title I). 
84 11 U.S.C. § 362; Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(8). 
85 11 U.S.C. § 1129; Dodd-Frank Act § 210(b). 
86 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7); Dodd-Frank Act § 210(d)(2). 
87 11 U.S.C. §§ 547–548; Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(11). 
88 11 U.S.C. § 365; Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c). 
89 Dodd-Frank Act § 209 (“To the extent possible, the [FDIC] shall seek to harmonize applicable 
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available in a non-functioning market surrounding a SIFI failure. Codifying such tools 
allows  the  FDIC  to  ensure  financial  stability  of  the  markets  throughout  the  orderly 
liquidation processes. 
1.  Speed of Proceedings 
Title II provides for a resolution under the OLA to be completed in an exceptionally 
short period of time. The statute provides for this desired speed of proceedings through 
provisions that limit access to the judiciary and impose severe time limits. While some of 
these provisions may seem novel compared to the Bankruptcy Code, they are, in fact, 
quite in-line with current practices that aim to conclude the reorganization process as 
quickly as possible. 
Traditional  bankruptcy  law  employs  the  judiciary  to  provide  a  forum  for  the 
balancing  of  power  between  the  debtor,  the  creditors,  the  debtor-in-possession  (DIP) 
lender, and the bankruptcy judge. The OLA, however, stifles this power struggle by the 
allocation of almost all power over the process in the hands of the FDIC.
90 Moreover, this 
power  is  rarely  subject  to  judicial  review  throughout  the  entirety  of  an  orderly 
liquidation,
91 thereby allowing the process to move along quite quickly. Although this 
appears at first glance to be a significant divergence from the Bankruptcy Code, that is 
not quite the case. In practice, current bankruptcy lawyers seek to avoid, as much as 
possible, the  often messy and lengthy power battle through the utilization of various 
techniques that have been increasingly accepted by both the legislature and the judiciary. 
“Pre-packaged” bankruptcies cut through the battleground by allowing a DIP to use votes 
for a plan of reorganization obtained prior to bankruptcy to effectuate class consent.
92 
Section 363 sales avoid a full-fledged reorganization processes entirely by allowing a 
quick  sale  of  essentially  the  entire  bankruptcy  estate,
93 which,  once  concluded,  is 
                                                         
90 See Baird & Morrison, supra note 1, at 288. 
91 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 202(a)(1) (limited judicial review of the FDIC’s appointment as receiver), 
210(h)(17) (no judicial review of credit obtained for the covered financial company under § 
210(h)(16)), 210(a)(9)(D), (a)(4) (limited judicial review of claims determinations). 
92 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b). 
93 Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition – From Boom to Bust and Into the Future, 81 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 375, 385 (2007) (“Today, chapter 11 more often than not is a means to validate and 
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judicially unreviewable.
94 Moreover, several other aspects of the bankruptcy process are 
judicially unreviewable
95 which has the effect of mooting the power struggle, putting the 
authority to act in fewer hands, and speeding the reorganization along. Thus, the OLA 
appears to cut right to the result these bankruptcy techniques aim to achieve—quick, 
decisive action by a single entity that is not subject to judicial review. Although some 
question the wisdom behind the appointment of the FDIC to this position of power over 
financial companies with which it has little experience,
96 bankruptcy judges have even 
less  experience  in  such  matters
97 and  allowing  private  parties  to  negotiate  a  workout 
without government interference would likely cause further delays and complications in 
the case of a SIFI failure.
98 Moreover, the FDIC does have similar experience resolving 
failed  insured  depositories  and  has  the  potential  to  learn  significantly  about  these 
nonbank financial companies through the review of the Section 165(d) Resolution Plans. 
So while the OLA may sacrifice some of the due process that the Bankruptcy Code (at 
least superficially) provides, its limited provisions for access to the judiciary are not too 
far removed from current practices  and  are  arguably necessary in the case of a SIFI 
failure.
99  
Title II time limitations also go significantly further to force a speedy OLA process. 
The automatic stay restricting shareholder and creditor rights
100 and barring counterparty 
enforcement  of  ipso  facto  clauses
101 lasts  only  for  the  ninety  days  following  FDIC’s 
appointment as receiver. Moreover, the stay against judicial proceedings involving the 
covered financial company also only lasts ninety days after it has been requested by the 
FDIC.
102 The  claims  determination  deadlines—180  days  for  most  claims
103 and  only 
                                                         
94 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (“The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization…of a sale or 
lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization…”). 
95 Id. § 364(e) (rendering appellate review of DIP lending approval moot); U.C.C. § 9-401 
(rendering grant of security in violation of negative pledge clause judicially unreviewable). 
96 See Scott, supra note 5, at V.A. 
97 See Baird & Morrison, supra note 1, at 292 (pointing out that the bankruptcy process “calls for 
decisions by judges who know comparatively little about the firm or its industry). 
98 See id. (discussing experience of private party workout to save Long-Term Capital 
Management, which required significant coaxing from the Federal Reserve, and pointing out that 
the ability of the government to step in in such a situation would be desirable). 
99 See Stephen J. Lubben, Some Powers for Dealing With Failed Financial Firms, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 10, 2011) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/some-powers-for-dealing-with-failed-
financial-firms.  
100 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(1)(M). 
101 Id. § 210(c)(13)(C)(i). 
102 Id. § 210(a)(8)(A). Note also that this is a divergence from the Bankruptcy Code in that the stay 
against judicial proceedings is automatic under that Code.  
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ninety days for claims requiring expedited relief
104—also work to force the FDIC to act 
quickly.  Furthermore,  the  FDIC  has  announced  that  it  will  be  able  to  complete  the 
receivership process and bring a covered financial company out of receivership within six 
to nine months using the securities-for-claims exchange method, described below.
105 
Although these times limits and limitations on judicial review are more stringent than 
those existing in the Bankruptcy Code, they reflect the industry-wide preference for quick 
reorganizations. Moreover, they provide the FDIC with the tools necessary to ensure a 
quick reorganization that would probably be much more difficult to achieve in traditional 
bankruptcy  given  the  size  and  systemic  nature  of  a  contemplated  covered  financial 
company.
106 
2.  Advance Dividends and Distributions to Creditors & Disparate Treatment of 
Similarly Situated Creditors 
Many techniques traditionally used by bankruptcy lawyers seek to maneuver around 
the Bankruptcy Code’s rigid absolute priority and automatic stay rules in order to favor 
certain “critical” or priority creditors to ensure the continued functioning of the debtor’s 
operations. “First day motions” are typically granted by the bankruptcy judge to allow 
payment to such critical vendors and priority creditors under the authority of Section 
363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows the trustee (or DIP), after notice and a 
hearing, to “use, sell, or lease other than in the ordinary course of business, property of 
the estate.” Moreover, the use of Section 363(b) to sell essentially the entire business and, 
in  that  sale,  to  favor  certain  stakeholders  over  others  is  increasingly  common  and 
accepted by bankruptcy judges.
107  
                                                         
104 Id. §§ 210(a)(5)(A), (B) (expedited relief allowed to avoid “irreparable injury” to a claimant). 
105 SPOE Notice, supra note 58, at 76,620. 
106 Compare 2004 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC 71 (Christopher M. McHugh & Thomas 
A. Sawyer eds., 2004) (in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, the average length of a Chapter 11 
reorganization was 14.0, 13.5, 13.8, and 18.2 months, respectively), with Michael J. De La 
Merced, Lehman Estate Emerges From Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012) 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/lehman-estate-emerges-from-bankruptcy/ (the Lehman 
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The OLA grants to the FDIC formal authority to carry out these types of maneuvers 
through the ability to make advance dividends and distributions to creditors
108 and to treat 
similarly situation creditors differently.
109 While this authority may seem extremely broad 
at first glance, the FDIC has limited it significantly through regulations that establish 
which classes of stakeholders may never receive additional payments
110 and provide for 
significant  procedural  requirements  that  must  be  met  for  any  such  payments  to  be 
distributed.
111 Additionally,  the  statute  itself  provides  several  limitations  upon  these 
payments including that none may be more than the face value amount of any claim
112 
and  that  they  are  subject  to  the  “no  worse  off  than  in  liquidation”  requirement.
113 
Furthermore, the FDIC has made clear that it only intends for such advance payments to 
be made, for example, to “essential and necessary service providers” or “creditors with 
contract claims that are tied to performance bonds or other creditor support needed for the 
covered financial company to qualify to continue other valuable contracts.”
114  
Thus, this authority is more akin to traditional bankruptcy “first day motions” and 
“critical  vendor”  payments,  than  just  a  general  carte  blanche  authority  to  abandon 
absolute priority as was originally feared. The aim of this authority, however, is not to 
simply keep the covered financial system afloat, as it is in traditional bankruptcy, but 
more broadly to prevent systemic collateral damage were the covered financial company 
                                                         
108 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(d)(4) (allowing the FDIC to make additional payments to certain 
creditors if it is determined that such payments are necessary or appropriate to minimize losses 
from the orderly liquidation of the covered financial company). 
109 Id. §§ 210(b)(4), 210(h)(5)(E) (allowing the FDIC to treat similarly situated creditors 
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forced to shut down systemically important operations because key vendors or creditors 
refused to continue doing business with it.
115 
3.  Orderly Liquidation Fund 
In traditional bankruptcy, debtors can obtain post-petition financing (DIP financing) 
to allow them to continue operations during their reorganization by granting DIP lenders 
seniority or security equal to or above all other pre-petition debt.
116 While the OLA also 
authorizes similar financing,
117 it further provides for a guaranteed source of liquidity 
from the Treasury if the FDIC cannot find anyone in the private sector to lend to the 
covered financial company. This government guaranteed liquidity is to come from the 
Orderly  Liquidation  Fund  (OLF)  and  may  be  in  the  form  of  direct  funding  (senior 
unsecured  or  secured  debt)  or  guarantees  (of  assets  or  debt  issued  to  others).
118 
Immediately following the appointment of the FDIC as receiver, the maximum obligation 
limitation  (MOL)  of  the  OLF  is  10%  of  the  total  consolidated  assets  of  the  covered 
financial company based upon the most recent financial statement available.
119 After a 
preliminary valuation of the assets and preparation of a mandatory repayment plan, the 
MOL increases to 90% of the fair value of the total consolidated assets available for 
repayment.
120 The OLF must be repaid either from recoveries on assets of the failed firm 
or from risk-based assessments imposed on eligible financial companies.
121 The OLF has 
priority over all other claims
122 and must be repaid in full before any shareholders of a 
covered financial company receive any payment.
123  
Liquidity is arguably one of the most essential aspects to the successful resolution of 
a SIFI. However, as was the case in the 2008 financial crisis, creditors who provide such 
liquidity  tend  to  panic  in  the  case  a  of  a  debtor  failure  or  near  failure.  Financial 
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institutions are particularly vulnerable to such panics because they rely upon short-term 
borrowing to continue operations.
124 These short-term lenders, however, have the ability 
to run from a failing institution much more easily than can long-term lenders to avoid 
being  forced  to  sustain  a  loss  in  a  future  resolution.
125 Moreover,  it  will  likely  be 
exceptionally  difficult  to  find  a  traditional  DIP  lender  for  a  SIFI  given  its  size,  risk 
profile, and complexity.
126 Thus, the OLF provides a necessary backstop to prevent such 
credit runs from destroying an otherwise viable reorganization by guaranteeing a SIFI 
access to liquidity.
127  
4.  Qualified Financial Contract Treatment 
In traditional bankruptcy, derivatives, repos, and other “qualified financial contracts” 
(QFCs) are exempt from the automatic stay,
128 the stay of setoff rights,
129 the trustee’s 
contract assumption and rejection powers,
130 the nullification of ipso facto clauses,
131 and 
the trustee’s avoidance powers.
132 The OLA includes similar “safe-harbors” for QFCs.
133 
However, the OLA does provide a short window for the nullification of ipso facto clauses 
of QFCs until 5:00 p.m. on the business day following the appointment of the FDIC as 
receiver.
134 This short time frame is meant to allow the FDIC to transfer a portfolio of 
QFCs from the failed covered financial company to a solvent counterparty, such that, 
ideally, upon the window’s expiration, the ipso facto clause is no longer activated and can 
no longer be used to terminate the contract.
135 According to the FDIC, “[t]he exemption 
from the automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code in the case of qualified financial 
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contracts generally works well in most cases. However, for [SIFIs], in which the sudden 
termination and netting of a derivatives portfolio could have an adverse impact on U.S. 
financial stability, the nullification of the ipso facto clause is needed.”
136 Indeed, QFCs 
caused such disruption in Lehman’s bankruptcy that a “key driver of the new regime was 
the need for a better mechanism to handle these contracts” in the case of a SIFI failure.
137 
So while there is a very clear divergence from the Bankruptcy Code in this facet of the 
OLA, it is a necessary one.  
The OLA further seeks to minimize the risk of contractual defaults occurring during a 
SIFI’s failure by limiting the ability of cross-default provisions to trigger a domino effect 
of defaults through the company’s subsidiaries. Cross-default provisions “allow a non-
defaulting  party  to  terminate  a  contract  if  an  affiliate  of  its  counterparty  defaults  or 
fails.”
138 Because  of  the  potential  systemic  consequences  of  these  provisions,  Title  II 
vests the FDIC with the authority to enforce contracts of the subsidiaries or affiliates of 
the covered financial company, notwithstanding any cross-default provisions,
139 such that 
they remain in full force and effect and may not be terminated merely as a result of the 
receivership process. If the obligations under such contracts are supported by the covered 
financial company, the support and all related assets and liabilities must be transferred 
either  to  a  bridge  financial  company  or  a  qualified  transferee  by  5:00  p.m.  on  the 
following  business  day,  or  the  FDIC  must  provide  adequate  protection  to  the 
counterparties to such contracts.
140 If, however, there are is no such support provided by 
the covered financial company, but the contract is merely linked to it, the FDIC may 
enforce  it  without  providing  any  adequate  protection  or  transferring  anything  to  the 
bridge financial company.  
Significantly, cross-default provisions may still be in effect in foreign subsidiaries or 
affiliates of U.S. institutions. This may only be remedied either (1) through changes in 
foreign  law,  mutual  recognition  agreements,  or  adoption  of  a  treaty  or  (2)  through 
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contractual  changes  removing  such  cross-default  provisions.
141  Because  there  are 
significant deficiencies with a solution that relies upon contractual changes, diplomatic 
solutions involving legislative and executive action may be necessary.
142 
5.  Single Point of Entry Strategy & Bridge Financial Companies 
The FDIC has announced that the preferred method of resolution under the OLA will 
involve an approach known as the Single Point of Entry (SPOE) strategy.
143 Under this 
strategy, only the parent holding company of the failed or failing SIFI will be placed into 
FDIC  receivership,  with  all  other  operating  subsidiaries  maintaining  uninterrupted 
operations. Key assets and associated liabilities of the parent will be transferred to a 
bridge financial company, with most other unsecured liabilities to be left behind in the 
receivership. Lastly, a securities-for-claims transaction will be completed to capitalize the 
new  entity  and  resolve  all  old  liabilities.  Although  this  approach  is  significantly 
supported by several provisions in Title II, it is not entirely exclusive to Title II and, to a 
great extent, builds off of traditional bankruptcy techniques.  
Specifically, the provision in Title II allowing for the creation of a bridge financial 
company—a  temporary  financial  institution  owned  and  indirectly  managed  by  the 
FDIC—is a mechanism to simplify and streamline various bankruptcy maneuvers used to 
separate and keep good assets and liabilities and reject bad ones, such as the traditional 
trustee contract rejection and assumption powers in bankruptcy.
144 Unlike the trustee’s 
contracting authority in bankruptcy, however, which is subject to the court’s approval,
145 
the  FDIC,  as  receiver,  has  essentially  unlimited  discretion  to  select  those  assets  and 
liabilities  that  will  be  transferred  to  the  bridge  financial  company.
146 Moreover,  the 
process is even further streamlined through the proposed SPOE strategy due to the typical 
structure of U.S. holding companies, which have a very limited set of stakeholders and 
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far simpler assets than do their operating subsidiaries. For the most part, nearly all assets 
of the holding company—primarily investments in and loans to subsidiaries—would be 
transferred  to  the  bridge  financial  company.
147 On  the  other  hand,  only  those  claims 
necessary to facilitate its operation and to mitigate systemic risk would be transferred, 
such as “obligations of vendors providing essential services”
148 and “secured claims with 
the  related  collateral  [which]  would  not  diminish  the  net  value  of  the  assets  in  the 
receivership and would avoid any systemic risk effects from the immediate liquidation of 
the  collateral.”
149 Just  as  contracts  assumed  in  bankruptcy  are  given  administrative 
priority, “liabilities transferred to the bridge financial company [in the OLA] as an on-
going institution would be paid in the ordinary course of business.”
150  
A  securities-for-claims  exchange  would  then  be  undertaken  both  to  satisfy  the 
remaining unsecured claims left in the receivership and to capitalize the new holding 
company  such  that  the  company  is  able  to  exit  the  bridge  resolution  stage.
151 In  this 
transaction, the claims of creditors left in the receivership would be satisfied based upon 
priority  by  an  issuance  of  securities  representing  debt,  equity,  and,  contingent 
securities—such as warrants or options—of the new holding company (NewCo).
152 To 
the extent that the value of the shareholders’ and remaining unsecured creditors’ claims 
on  the  covered  financial  company  exceed  the  value  of  NewCo,  those  claims  will  be 
written off, or “bailed-in,” according to priority.  
This type of exchange would provide value to the creditors without resorting to a 
liquidation  of  the  assets,  which  would  likely  cause  fire  sales  capturing  little  value. 
Moreover, the issuance of contingent value rights—such as warrants or options allowing 
the purchase of equity in NewCo or other instruments—to subordinated claimants, who 
would  otherwise  be  impaired,  protects  those  classes  against  the  possibility  that  the 
approved  valuation  point  underestimates  the  market  value  of  the  company.”
153 
Shareholders of the holding company, however, will almost certainly be entirely wiped 
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out  to  absorb  the  losses  of  the  covered  financial  company.  This  use  of  bail-in  of 
shareholders and unsecured debt holders is in-line with traditional bankruptcy practice 
and is preferable to alternatives.
154  
Although  questions  have  been  raised  regarding  the  FDIC’s  ability  to  accurately 
valuate these NewCos, the securities-for-claims exchange approach is still preferable to a 
purchase  and  assumption  transaction  or  a  merger
155 because  it  would  “not  create 
additional concentration in the marketplace that otherwise would result from selling the 
bridge holding company to another large financial company.” Additionally, the FDIC has 
relayed  its  intention  to  retain  independent  experts,  including  investment  bankers  and 
accountants,  to  complete  an  accurate  valuation;  and  the  use  of  contingent  securities, 
described above, should adequately protect against undervaluation. Moreover, although 
there is an increasingly supported argument for market sale based valuations in traditional 
bankruptcy due to the perceived lack of judicial expertise in valuation, such arguments 
likely lose much of their validity in the case of SIFIs because of their size, complexity, 
and the limited number of potential buyers in the market. 
In order for the SPOE strategy to be effective, it is necessary that there be sufficient 
loss-absorbing  capacity—shareholders  and  unsecured  debt—at  the  holding-company 
level. Currently, in the U.S., “the capital structures of large financial holding companies 
are characterized by equity and large amounts of unsecured debt of various maturities. 
This debt is structurally subordinated within the group, and limited external unsecured 
debt tends to be raised at entities below the financial holding company.”
156 So, while this 
norm makes the SPOE strategy theoretically possible for U.S. SIFIs (putting aside the 
problem of G-SIFIs based abroad), it also “creates incentives for these companies to shift 
their structure.”
157 Thus, the Federal Reserve has announced that it will issue a proposal 
to require SIFIs to hold minimum amounts of long-term, unsecured debt at the holding 
company  level.
158 Moreover,  to  ensure  that  a  failed  subsidiary  may  be  effectively 
recapitalized through the SPOE strategy as well, there may be, included in the proposed 
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rule, an intracompany debt requirement.
159 There remains, however, a further issue to be 
resolved regarding the recapitalization of the subsidiaries. As noted by some commenters 
to the FDIC, the current proposals address only the right side of the balance sheet (i.e., 
debt and capital requirements at the holding company level), but do not address the left 
side of the balance sheet (i.e., assets of the holding company which can actually be used 
to recapitalize subsidiaries).
160  
Finally, the FDIC has made clear that the new company would need to emerge from 
the receivership with a structure that corrects the problems that led to the company’s 
failure. It must meet or exceed regulatory capital requirements, must not pose a systemic 
risk to the financial system, and must be resolvable under the Bankruptcy Code in the 
case  of  a  subsequent  failure.
161 Changes  necessary  may  include  “changes  in  the 
company’s  business,  shrinking  those  businesses,  breaking  them  into  smaller  entities, 
and/or liquidating certain assets or closing certain operations.”
162 Ideally, it would “result 
in the operations and legal entity structure of the company being more closely aligned.”
163 
These  requirements  are  consistent  with  the  provision  in  the  Bankruptcy  Code  that 
conditions approval of a plan of reorganization upon the determination that such plan “is 
not  likely  to  be  followed  by  the  liquidation,  or  the  need  for  further  financial 
reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan . . . .”
164  
Clearly, the most advantageous implication of this strategy is that key, systemically 
important operations at the subsidiary level may continue to function, uninterrupted by 
the resolution process. For example, to “the extent that operational contracts and other 
critical agreements are obligations of subsidiaries of the bridge financial company, they 
would  not  be  affected  by  the  appointment  of  the  FDIC  as  receiver  of  the  holding 
company under the SPOE strategy.”
165 Moreover, because the subsidiaries “would remain 
open  and  operating  as  going  concerns,  and  any  obligations  supporting  subsidiaries’ 
contracts would be transferred to the bridge financial company, counterparties to most of 
the  financial  company’s  derivative  contracts  would  have  [neither]  legal  right  [nor 
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financial motivation] to terminate and net out of their contracts.”
166 Most significantly, 
however, is that under the SPOE, the FDIC is essentially guaranteeing the continued 
operation of the IDI subsidiary of the SIFI, whereas in a resolution under the Bankruptcy 
Code,  it  is  very  likely—and  at  best  uncertain—that  the  FDIC  would  place  the  IDI 
subsidiary into a traditional FDIA receivership. This is so significant because for most of 
these SIFIs, a receivership of their IDI subsidiary means the loss of the core business, 
such that a true reorganization would be effectively precluded, leaving liquidation as the 
only possibility.  
6.  Accountability & Punitive Measures 
The  FDIC  has  indicated  that,  similar  to  the  tradition  of DIP management during 
bankruptcy,  the  day-to-day  management  of  the  bridge  financial  company  will  be 
supervised  by  the  officers  and  directors  of  the  company,  while  only  high-level  key 
matters  will  be  controlled  by  the  FDIC.
167 However,  as  part  of  the  OLA’s  goal  to 
eliminate moral hazard, the original management responsible for the company’s failure 
must be removed from office and will be replaced by a new temporary board of directors 
and  new  CEO  from  a  “pre-screened  pool  of  eligible  candidates.”
168 While  this  is  a 
substantial deviation from the current Bankruptcy Code, it is not altogether unfamiliar 
from  the  realm  of  U.S.  reorganizations.  In  fact  this  provision  is  reminiscent  of  the 
essentially  mandatory  displacement  of  management  and  the  board  of  directors  under 
Chapter  X  of  the  Chandler  Act  of  1938.
169 And  although  Chapter  11  of  the  current 
Bankruptcy Code was enacted to provide more job security to managers than did the 
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Chandler Act
170 and contains no mandatory management removal, it is still quite common 
for management to be replaced in the midst of a bankruptcy.
171 
The punitive measures to be taken against senior executives and directors responsible 
for a covered financial company’s failure are also familiar to current bankruptcy law, 
particularly those provisions added to the Code in 2005.
172 The FDIC has the authority to 
hold liable directors, officers, attorneys, accountants, and others for grossly negligent 
conduct that resulted in the “improvident or otherwise improper use or investment of any 
assets of the covered financial company.”
173 Moreover, the FDIC also has the authority to 
recoup from current or former senior executives or directors substantially responsible for 
the failure of the company any compensation received during the two years prior to the 
receivership
174 and the Federal Reserve has the authority to bar certain such executives 
from working for any financial institution for a period of time.
175 
III. ASSESSMENT OF PURPOSE 
Through the OLA provisions addressed above, both those that diverge from and those 
that coincide with the Bankruptcy Code, the new resolution regime created by the Dodd-
Frank  Act  aims  to  achieve  two  goals  which  cannot  be  met  under  current  traditional 
bankruptcy law: (1) perseveration of financial stability of the market in the case of a 
SIFI’s failure, and (2) minimization of moral hazard.
176 The first of these twin goals—
preservation of financial stability in the case of a failure—is concerned directly with ex-
post failure management. This encompasses not only the mitigation of direct collateral 
damage caused by significant SIFI interconnectedness, but also indirect collateral damage 
caused  by  contagion  spurred  by  a  SIFI’s  failure.  The  second  goal—minimization  of 
moral hazard—, although technically a restriction on the ex-post methods that may be 
used to achieve the first goal (e.g., a bar against bail-outs), is, in fact, primarily concerned 
with  ex-ante  incentive  structuring  to  prevent  failure  in  the  first  place  (i.e.,  risk 
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minimization).  The  elimination  of  moral  hazard,  thus,  also  has  two  facets:  (1)  a 
minimization  of  reliance  on  the  “Too  Big  To  Fail”  (TBFT)  subsidy  and  (2)  the 
maximization of market discipline.
177  
At the outset, these two goals do not seem to be in tension. The most plausible way to 
achieve  both  the  goal  of  financial  stability  and  of  minimization  of  moral  hazard  is 
through the use of the tools available under this new resolution regime, described above, 
to bring certainty to the market. For example, if the financial industry is certain where 
losses  will  be  borne  in  the  case  of  a  SIFI  failure,  they  will  cease  relying  upon  the 
government to bear such losses. That is, if creditors are certain that they will bear those 
losses,  their  monitoring  incentives  will  increase  and  they  will  be  able  to  prevent  the 
debtor from undertaking activities that are simply too risky (through increased finance 
charges, contract covenants, etc.) and market discipline will be restored, thus reducing the 
likelihood of initial failure.
178 Furthermore, creating certainty regarding what will happen 
if a SIFI fails reduces the potential for panic-induced contagion when a SIFI actually 
does, indeed, fail.  
Several  specific  provisions  of  Title  II,  including  the  prohibition  of  government 
bailouts,
179 the mandate of creditor priority,
180 and the FDIC’s mandate to align the OLA 
with the Bankruptcy Code
181 seek to ensure certainty of where losses will be borne if 
there is a failure. Moreover, as discussed above, the publicly released portions of the Title 
I,  Section  165(d)  Resolution  Plans  also  have  the  potential  to  provide  increased 
transparency to the market regarding specific SIFI structures and where potential losses 
may be borne.
182  
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The provisions for the Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF)
183 and the mechanisms that 
support the SPOE approach also both provide additional certainty to the market in terms 
of conveying transparency regarding how the FDIC will carry out a resolution using the 
OLA  and  in  terms  of  assuring  the  continuity  of  systemically  important  operations 
throughout the resolution process. However, each of these two tools to be utilized by the 
FDIC to preserve financial stability may seemingly be at odds with Title II’s twin goal of 
eliminating moral hazard and thus require further consideration. 
A.  The Orderly Liquidation Fund & Moral Hazard 
The OLF—one of the most significant,  distinguishing features of the OLA when 
compared  to  traditional  bankruptcy—likely  is,  indeed,  necessary  for  maintaining 
financial  stability  both in  terms  of  minimizing  potential  collateral  failures  due  to  the 
interconnectedness of a failed SIFI and in terms of stemming contagion spurred by the 
failure  of  a  SIFI.  The  OLF  provides  not  only  actual  necessary  liquidity  to  keep 
systemically important operations functioning, but also provides assurance to the markets 
of  that  liquidity  to  stem  possible  panic  and  ensuing  run-like  behavior.
184 Run-like 
behavior (i.e., contagion) has existed since the beginning of the existence of the banking 
system.
185 The only effective way to prevent such runs by short-term creditors is arguably 
through the guarantee of liquidity by the government as the lender of last resort or the 
guarantee of capital injections by the government.
186 Indeed, the OLF functions much 
like a guarantee of government-provided liquidity and has the potential to be used to 
indirectly  inject  capital  into  a  SIFI  subsidiary  (as  discussed  below).  Of  considerable 
importance, then, is whether use of the OLF, as such a guarantee, is reconcilable with the 
goal of elimination of moral hazard, both in terms of ending TBTF and in terms of 
promoting market discipline.  
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1.  The Orderly Liquidation Fund & “Too Big To Fail” 
The question of whether this government guarantee of liquidity is reconcilable with 
the resolution to end TBTF turns on the definition of TBTF. The TBTF subsidy comes in 
at least two forms: (1) equity capital injections that prevent bankruptcy and therefore 
shareholder and creditor bail-in (i.e., the typical notion of a government bailout), and (2) 
cheaper  financing  due  to  the  perceived  lack  of  bankruptcy  risk  as  a  result  of  the 
assumption of those capital injections.
187 Clearly the former of these is only realized if 
and  when  a  firm  actually  receives  a  bailout.  However,  according  to  a  recent  study 
conducted  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  large  U.S.  banks  received  a 
funding advantage of as much as $70 billion between 2011 and 2012.
188 That is, investors 
demanded at least 15 basis points less from big banks than smaller ones or companies 
outside the banking sector because of the perception that the government would not let 
them fail.
189 That number is even more extreme in a study by the New York Federal 
Reserve, which found that investors demanded 31 basis points less from big banks.
190 
If it is merely the cessation of equity capital injections (and subsequently the cheaper 
financing obtained by reliance upon them) that is sought in order to end TBTF, then the 
use  of  the  OLF  to  stem  contagion  seems  to  pose  no  threat  to  that  goal.  In  fact,  as 
mentioned  above,  such  bailouts  are  directly  prohibited  under  section  206—the 
“Mandatory Terms and Conditions for All Orderly Liquidation Actions”—of Title II.
191 
Moreover, distributions from the OLF are explicitly subject to this prohibition.
192 The 
allowable uses of the OLF funds—for liquidity purposes only—are explicitly laid out in 
the  Dodd-Frank  Act  itself
193 and  made  clearer  through  notices  promulgated  by  the 
FDIC.
194 Moreover, according to regulators, the OLF is only to be used if absolutely 
necessary when no private funding is available and only for a short period of time.
195 
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Thus, it seems to be the case that the OLF not only poses no threat to the end of TBTF, 
but rather, by clearly defining how government money may be used in the case of a SIFI 
failure, it may foster bringing about its end through correcting the market presumption of 
bailouts. Moreover, government guarantees of liquidity, such as the Federal Reserve’s 
traditional role as lender of last resort, are typically not critiqued under a TBTF, anti-
bailout argument. They are merely regulatory devices used to compensate for inefficient 
or non-functioning markets. Thus, use of the OLF, as such a government guarantee of 
liquidity, in tandem with efforts to eliminate TBTF would not be inconsistent. 
On the other hand, some argue that the provision for the OLF, which may only be 
utilized by firms under the FDIC’s OLA receivership, is essentially a new manifestation 
of the TBTF subsidy in a third form: guaranteed liquidity in times of failure or near 
failure to “Systemically Important Financial Institutions.” This argument gains traction in 
the  fact  that  only  those  financial  institutions  that  are  deemed  to  be  so  large  and 
interconnected  as  to  be  “systemically  important”  (a  designation  that,  to  some  extent, 
sounds like a euphemism for “too big to fail”) are granted access to this lender of last 
resort liquidity. Other, smaller non-bank financial institutions have no access to such 
government guaranteed liquidity.
196 For those who view this as a de-facto subsidy for 
SIFIs, the OLF seems to be irreconcilable with an eradication of TBTF.
197   
However, others argue that this provision for access to lender of last resort liquidity is 
acceptable notwithstanding the fact that it is only available to SIFIs. To them, because it 
is not a capital injection, it is still not a TBTF subsidy. That only some institutions have 
access  is  merely  a  function  of  governmental  regulatory  necessity  to  protect  financial 
stability. Moreover, the burden placed on said SIFIs under the new regulatory regime of 
the  Dodd-Frank  Act  arguably  compensates  for  any  possibility  of  subsidy  gained  by 
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new limitations upon the Federal Reserve’s section 13(3) power to lend to non-bank financial 
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TIMES (Dec. 19, 2013) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/why-federal-reserve-support-is-
really-a-bailout/.  The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic or Unrealistic? 
38 
potential access to the OLF. For example, the very firms that supposedly would gain 
through this new TBTF subsidy may be carrying the brunt of the cost of such financing 
through risk-based assessments imposed upon them if the assets of the failed SIFI are 
insufficient to repay in full the obligations to the Treasury.
198 
Lastly, a further complication in this analysis is raised by the possibility that the OLF 
may,  indeed,  be  used,  not  only  for  liquidity,  but  also  (albeit  indirectly)  for  capital 
injections at the subsidiary level. Specifically, it remains uncertain how or if the capital 
injection limitations will restrict a holding company’s use of the OLF funds to aid in the 
recapitalization of its subsidiaries per the SPOE resolution approach. For example, would 
it violate the bar against bailouts and raise the specter of TBTF if the holding company 
borrows from the OLF, then lends those funds to its subsidiary, but then cancels the debt 
immediately? That would effectively inject capital into the subsidiary, but it would also 
keep the holding company on the line for the debt still owed to the Treasury.
199 Does that 
change if the holding company actually has assets of value to borrow against such that 
the OLF loan remains fully secured?
200 
2.  The Orderly Liquidation Fund & Market Discipline 
Putting aside the possibility of indirect usage of the OLF for capital injections, there 
is  further  question  regarding  the  how  the  OLF’s  use  as  a  government  guarantee  of 
liquidity may affect market discipline, in the broader sense, to continue the perpetuation 
of moral hazard. Once again such determination turns upon the definition of the goal 
sought.  If  market  discipline  is  demanded  such  that  no  government  intervention  is 
contemplated or allowed,
201 any support from the government, whether in the form of 
capital  injections  or  lender  of  last  resort  liquidity  under  a  new  resolution  regime,  is 
unacceptable. In that case, the OLF, as government guaranteed liquidity, is irreconcilable 
with the goal of market discipline.  
                                                         
198 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(o). 
199 See Comm. on Capital Mkts. Reg. Comment Letter to the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Notice 
regarding Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry 
Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76614, Feb. 18, 2014 [hereinafter CCMR Comment on SPOE Notice]. 
200 It may be the case that the holding company cannot directly transfer those assets of value to the 
subsidiary due to independent regulations barring the subsidiary from holding assets of that type. 
Thus, this sort of indirect transfer of value through the OLF would be necessary. See id. 
201 See Dec. 2013 SRAC Meeting, supra note 28 (Simon Johnson and Anat Admati comments). The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic or Unrealistic? 
39 
If, however, the threshold demand for market discipline is lowered and it is accepted 
that there will inevitably always be market volatility, and lender of last resort liquidity is 
indeed acceptable to compensate for such volatility to ensure the financial stability of the 
economy, then the OLF is acceptable. Given that such a lender of last resort mechanism 
for  commercial  banks  has  been  traditionally  accepted,  it  seems  illogical  to  reject  the 
extension  of  such  a  mechanism  for  all  financial  institutions  that  engage  in  maturity 
transformation.  
A potential problem to be explored, however, is whether this analogy is appropriate. 
Is  the  depository  banking  system  of  the  Depression-era,  which  prompted  sustained 
reliance on the Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort, truly analogous to the bet-
making high-risk-taking shadow banking system of today? Should institutions operating 
within the shadow banking system receive such government guaranteed liquidity under 
the same argument that granted it to the depository banking system? Does the level of 
risk associated with either category of entities play a role in the decision to grant that 
guarantee? Should it? Does the value that they add to society play a role? Should it? Is 
shadow banking adding the same kind of wealth creation and credit extension value to 
society as traditional depository banks? And further, if they are granted access to this 
government guaranteed liquidity through the OLA, should they also be subject to more 
intense regulation? Such considerations are beyond the scope of this paper, but arguably 
worth exploring in order to truly assess the level of government involvement in these 
institutions at which society is comfortable. 
B.  Single Point of Entry & Moral Hazard 
The  mechanisms  supporting  the  SPOE  strategy,  identified  by  the  FDIC  as  the 
preferred method for effectuating a resolution under the OLA, are, like the OLF, arguably 
necessary for maintaining financial stability in the event of a SIFI’s failure by ensuring 
continuity of systemically important operations at the subsidiary level. However, this 
approach  also  raises  questions  of  moral  hazard.  Specifically,  whether  this  approach 
safeguards creditors of SIFI subsidiaries in such a way that is inconsistent with the goal 
of reduction of moral hazard should be taken into consideration.  The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical or Familiar? Idealistic or Unrealistic? 
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1.  Single Point of Entry & “Too Big To Fail” 
In  a  sense,  the  mechanisms  of  the  SPOE  strategy  will  shift  the  TBTF  subsidy 
protecting  creditors  of  SIFI  subsidiaries  from  the  government’s  shoulders  to  those 
creditors and shareholders of the SIFI holding company. Because only the creditors and 
shareholders of the holding company will likely be forced to bear the losses in the case of 
a failure, those transacting with the subsidiary get a de-facto subsidy protecting them 
from  loss.  Although  this  does  not  pose  a  problem  for  the  goal  of  eliminating  the 
government’s role in providing this subsidy, it does create an issue familiar from the 
TBTF subsidy—that is, subsidiaries of SIFIs will be able to take advantage of market 
inefficiencies to obtain cheaper financing from creditors who will be willing to receive a 
lower return on transactions or investments since they will misperceive their risk levels as 
being lower than it truly is.
202 Moreover, SIFI subsidiaries may also benefit from market 
inefficiencies generated by clients and counterparties who may transact more readily with 
them based on a perception of stability safeguarded by “governmental policy to prevent 
operational disruption and distress.”
203 
2.  Single Point of Entry & Market Discipline 
Moreover,  this  subsidy  provided  to  SIFI  subsidiary  creditors  could  also  have 
significant impacts upon market discipline. If creditors at the subsidiary level assume 
they will be protected from any potential loss by the creditors and shareholders at the 
holding company, their monitoring incentives are significantly discouraged. Not only is a 
reduction in monitoring incentives problematic in general, it would seem to be even more 
poignantly  an  issue  specifically  at  the  subsidiary  level,  given  that  this  is  where 
operations, which need to be monitored for excessive risk-taking, occur.  
The counterarguments to these potential issues are twofold. The first is that because 
the risk will shift to the creditors at the holding company level, so too will the monitoring 
incentives shift to those creditors, who will in turn demand appropriately high interest 
rates  to  compensate  for  their  increased  risk.  It  is,  however,  questionable  whether  the 
market appreciates fully these shifts in risk to adequately price their financing. It is also 
questionable  whether  the  creditors  at  the  holding  company  level  are  adequately 
positioned to monitor all of the company’s subsidiaries effectively and meaningfully. The 
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other counterargument offered in regards to this new creation of creditor subsidy and 
reduction  of  market  discipline  is  that  the  risk  does  not  transfer  so  completely  to  the 
holding company’s creditors as to leave those at the subsidiary completely immune from 
bail-in risk, and thus, subsidiary creditors still have a need to consider such risk in their 
financing charges and monitoring functions. While those at the holding company level 
will indeed be the first to go, Title II provides for an expedited mechanism to incorporate 
a  failed  subsidiary  into  the  receivership  process  along  with  the  holding  company  if 
necessary,
204 thereby putting the creditors of that subsidiary at risk to bear losses.
205 This, 
however, will likely not happen unless the losses are so great that the holding company 
cannot bear them. It would also have the potentially extremely negative consequence of 
causing disruptions of systemically important operations at the operating subsidiary level, 
precisely what the SPOE approach seeks to avoid.  
The  FDIC  is  admittedly  continuing  to  reach  for  a  position  regarding  the  SPOE 
approach that will create certainty regarding the resolution approach to be used and allow 
the  operating  subsidiaries  to  continue  functioning  to  prevent  systemic  risk,  but  also 
ensure  that  market  discipline  is  maintained  at  all  levels  of  the  company.  Another 
consideration that has been offered, however, is that regardless of the negative impacts on 
market discipline that the proposed SPOE approach may have on creditor monitoring 
incentives and inefficient risk pricing in financing, the situation is still better now with 
the existence of this resolution regime than it was in 2008 when moral hazard was even 
more pervasive. 
C.  Punitive and Accountability Measures & Financial Stability 
Also worthy of consideration, are those provisions which clearly seem to promote the 
elimination  of  moral  hazard,  but  which  may  have  questionable  effects  on  financial 
stability—the  punitive  and  accountability  measures  to  be  taken  if  a  firm  fails.  These 
include the mandatory removal of responsible management and board members
206 and the 
“mandatory” liquidation of the failed company.
207 Although the FDIC does seem quite 
serious regarding its determination to remove those responsible for the failure of the firm, 
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it is unclear precisely how this will be implemented in practice in a way that does not 
cause financial instability. For example, if the holding company is the only company put 
into  receivership  in  order  to  effectuate  the  SPOE  approach,  but  the  “responsible 
management” is at the operating subsidiary level, who will be removed?
208 Moreover, 
how  the  FDIC  will  determine  the  sufficient  level  of  responsibility is,  as  of  yet,  also 
unclear. It may, indeed, be quite difficult to determine whether the failure of the company 
is  due  to  poor  management  decisions  or  overall,  uncontrollable  market  conditions.
209 
Lastly,  the  FDIC  has  indicated  there  will  be  a  “pre-screened  pool  of  eligible 
[management]  candidates”  from  which  the  replacements  for  those  removed  may  be 
chosen.
210 However, it has been pointed out that insider knowledge of the firm, its assets, 
and its interconnectedness will be extraordinarily hard to replace
211 and significant value 
could be lost from removal of that knowledge.  
The mandatory liquidation of the company—in fact the very name of the “Orderly 
Liquidation Authority”—also creates some confusion, if not actual uncertainty, regarding 
the  approach  to  be  taken  to  resolve  a  failed  SIFI.  Liquidation  and  reorganization 
technically indicate two different methods of resolving a failed company. Liquidation 
involves selling off assets and closing down the business, while reorganization involves 
recapitalization and a going-concern business. Although a liquidation is clearly called for 
in  the  text  of  the  statute,  a  true  liquidation  of  a  SIFI  would  likely  have  significant 
problematic impacts on the financial stability of the market, causing fire-sales of assets, 
significant value loss, and contagion. Indeed, this is likely precisely why the FDIC seems 
to  have  never  even  considered  such  a  true  liquidation  approach  to  its  OLA 
implementation.
212 Rather,  the  FDIC  has  emphasized  use  of  the  SPOE  approach  and 
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securities-for-claims method of recapitalization, which seek to maintain critical services 
and  operations  of  the  company  in  a  reorganization-like,  rather  than  liquidation-like, 
resolution.
213 Although this departure from clear statutory text may create some reason 
for pause, it should also be noted that the lines between liquidation and reorganization 
even in traditional bankruptcy have become increasingly blurred. Reorganizations may 
occur  under  the  Bankruptcy  Code’s  Chapter  7  provision  for  liquidation,  while 
liquidations  may  occur  under  the  Chapter  11  provision  for  reorganization.  The 
importance of these distinctions has thus become less important. 
D.  The Utilization of the OLA  
The most worrisome aspect of Title II in terms of the certainty it brings to or removes 
from the market is in the uncertainty surrounding the actual utilization of the OLA—that 
is, both the uncertainty regarding which firms are eligible for resolution under the OLA 
and the uncertainty regarding under what circumstances the OLA will, in fact, be chosen 
to resolve a firm instead of allowing it to go through traditional bankruptcy.  
The first of these—regarding the eligibility of firms for resolution under the OLA—
creates significant uncertainty because, as discussed in Part II.B.3, a company may be 
eligible for resolution under Title II even if it has not been designated for supervision by 
the Federal Reserve under Title I.
214 The possibility of a firm being forced into an OLA 
receivership  with  no  prior  Title  I  preparation  is  unsettling  to  some  degree  and  this 
inconsistency could and should be addressed by the FDIC and the Federal Reserve to 
provide further clarification.  
The  second  aspect  of  this  uncertainty  of  the  actual  utilization  of  the  OLA—the 
triggering of the use of the OLA—creates significant uncertainty for several reasons. 
First is the fact that the triggering of the OLA involves multiple players—the “three 
keys”—and is essentially a political decision. Introducing politics creates uncertainty that 
depends, inter alia, on which political party is currently in control and when the next 
election  season  is.  Additionally  is  the  tension,  discussed  in  Part  II.B.2,  between  the 
FDIC’s insistence that the OLA will be used only in “extraordinary circumstances” and 
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the general view that neither traditional bankruptcy nor private market solutions will be 
able to effectively handle a SIFI failure.
215 
Although the mandate to align the OLA with the Bankruptcy Code
216 and the “no 
worse  off  than  in  liquidation”
217 requirement  may  alleviate  the  importance  of  this 
decision  to  some  degree,  there  remain  key  differences  between  the  two  resolution 
regimes that make the decision an important one. Most significantly, as discussed above 
are the guaranteed use of the OLF and the mechanisms that support the SPOE strategy, 
both of which create a distinguishable advantage to those SIFIs being resolved under the 
OLA over those forced to resolve themselves under the Bankruptcy Code without such 
protections.  
In light of this, it becomes even clearer why the FDIC has been unwavering with 
regard to its position that the Bankruptcy Code is, indeed, preferable to resolution under 
the OLA. If the market truly believes that traditional bankruptcy will, in fact, be used to 
let a firm fail in most cases, many of the moral hazard problems discussed above will not 
be such an issue. There will be no guarantee of the OLF because resolution under the 
OLA  is  not  guaranteed.  Similarly,  there  will  be  no  guarantee  of  subsidiary  creditor 
protection  because  a  resolution  utilizing  a  SPOE  approach  is  not  guaranteed.
218 
Furthermore, general market discipline will resurface and the TBTF subsidy will shrink if 
creditors truly believe they are exposed to some degree of default risk and bail-in in that 
their debtor SIFIs will be subjected to the Bankruptcy Code if they do fail. However, to 
the extent that resolution of a SIFI under the current Bankruptcy Code is simply not a 
credible option for these firms without breaking them down and to the extent that any 
new changes to the Bankruptcy Code would not eliminate the potential moral hazard 
problems posed by the OLA (because they, too, involve government funding), such moral 
hazard as  discussed  above  may, indeed, be unavoidable if financial stability is to be 
ensured.   
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Many problems remain to be addressed by the FDIC in its continued promulgation of 
rules outlining the contours of this new resolution regime. In terms of its ability to ensure 
financial stability of the market in the case of a SIFI failure, it is questionable whether the 
OLA even has the ability to truly deal with contagious panics like that which occurred in 
2008. Moreover, several key provisions of the OLA remain unclear such that they may 
foster uncertainty in the market, which could in fact spur a panic rather than contain one 
in the case of a near SIFI failure. It is also clear that significant work remains to be done 
to achieve assurances of cross-border coordination necessary during a G-SIFI resolution. 
It may indeed be the case that binding agreements with foreign regulators are the only 
way to guarantee such coordination. Additionally, the industry and public alike remain 
skeptical  regarding  the  usefulness  of  Section  165(d)  Resolution  Plans  and  doubt 
regulators’  willingness  to  utilize  this  planning  process  to  preemptively  force  SIFI 
restructuring that would simplify firm organizations to prevent initial failures altogether. 
Moral hazard problems also continue to permeate the current OLA resolution strategy 
suggested by the FDIC. TBTF persists in the possible use of the OLF to indirectly inject 
capital into subsidiaries and market discipline remains weak due to the de-facto subsidy 
that the SPOE approach seems to provide for subsidiary creditors. How these issues will 
be resolved may only be discovered if and when the next SIFI fails and if the regulators 
choose  to  resolve  it  under  the  OLA.  Until  then,  the  dialogue  between  regulators, 
politicians, finance professionals, lawyers, and academics will continue, seeking to eke 
out  the  theoretical  ideal  orderly  liquidation  of  a  significantly  important  financial 
institution. 